The Numbers Game: Signaling Effects of Pricing Formats in Housing Bargaining
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Series
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SpeakersYe Zhang (Stockholm School of Economics, Sweden)
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FieldFinance, Accounting and Finance
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LocationErasmus University Rotterdam, Campus Woudestein, room Langeveld 5.06
Rotterdam -
Date and time
November 24, 2026
11:45 - 13:00
Abstract
Seemingly cosmetic pricing conventions carry hard economic information. Combining the near-universe of U.S. home listings—76 million records from 2000 to 2022—with proprietary Redfin offer-level data, we show that listing formats signal sellers' private information in housing bargaining. Charm prices ($349,900) are set by impatient sellers and yield faster sales at modest concessions, whereas round prices ($350,000) reveal imprecise valuations and trigger more aggressive counteroffers, lower sale probabilities, and lower transaction prices. Guided by a signaling framework, we show that these formats are rational equilibrium strategies that shape price discovery and liquidity in decentralized asset markets.