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Albrecht, J., Gautier, P. and Vroman, S. (2014). Efficient Entry in Competing Auctions American Economic Review, 104(10):3288--3296.

  • Journal
    American Economic Review
View publication

In this paper, we demonstrate the efficiency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing efficiency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information.