van den Brink, J.R. and Funaki, Y. (2015). Axiomatization and Implementation of Discounted Shapley Values Social Choice and Welfare, 45(2):329--344.
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Affiliated author
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Publication year2015
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JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
In this paper we introduce discounting in the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (J Econ Theory 100:274–294, 2001) who implemented the Shapley value for cooperative transferable utility games. This modification of the mechanism yields the corresponding discounted Shapley value as the payoff distribution in every subgame perfect equilibrium. The class of discounted Shapley values contains the Shapley value and equal division solution as its extreme cases. Interestingly, we obtain axiomatizations of each solution in this class by generalizing the null player property (of the Shapley value) and nullifying player property (of the equal division solution) to the so-called δ-reducing player property.