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Sloof, R. (1997). Lobbying when the Decisionmaker can acquire independent information. Public Choice, 91(2):199--207.

  • Journal
    Public Choice
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Abstract In this comment it is argued that the game-theoretical analysis presented by Rasmusen (1993) is incomplete. First, a short description of his model is given, then a proposition stating all equilibria of the model is presented. The proposition supplements the analysis of Rasmusen by showing that an, in our view plausible, equilibrium is ignored. Thereupon a comprehensive equilibrium analysis leads us to qualify his argument; lobbying does not always fully substitute for independent investigation, truthful lobbying is not successful, and a lobbyist having the right information does not always gets his way.