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Beetsma, R. and Jensen, H. (2003). Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: a comment Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 35(1):129--136.


  • Journal
    Journal of Money, Credit and Banking

We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty. Finally, their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy. Without these, preference uncertainty is never desirable