Hinloopen, J., Onderstal, S. and Treuren, L. (2020). Cartel Stability in Experimental First-Price Sealed-Bid and English auctions International Journal of Industrial Organization, 71.
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Affiliated authorsSander Onderstal, Leonard Treuren
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Publication year2020
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JournalInternational Journal of Industrial Organization
Using laboratory experiments, we compare the stability of bidding rings in the first-price sealed-bid auction and the English auction in a heterogeneous-value setting. In both a re-matching condition and a fixed-matching condition, we observe that bidding rings are more stable in the English auction than in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In both conditions, the first-price sealed-bid auction dominates the English auction in terms of average revenue and the revenue spread. The English auction outperforms the first-price sealed-bid auction in terms of efficiency.