Chan, K., Menkveld, A. and Yang, Z. (2008). Information Asymmetry and Asset Prices: Evidence from the Foreign Share Discount The Journal of Finance, 63(1):159--196.
Dittmann, I. and Maug, E. (2007). Lower salaries and no options? On the optimal structure of executive pay The Journal of Finance, 62(1):303--343.
Boot, A., Gopalan, R. and Thakor, A. (2006). The entrepreneur's choice between private and public ownership The Journal of Finance, 61(2):803--836.
Perotti, E. and von Thadden, E.L. (2006). The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents Journal of Political Economy, 114(1):145--174.
Weitzel, U. and Berns, S. (2006). Cross-border takeovers, corruption, and related aspects of governance Journal of International Business Studies, 37(6):786--806.
Baltussen, G., Post, G.(. and van Vliet, W.(. (2006). Violations of Cumulative Prospect Theory in Mixed Gambles with Moderate Probabilities Management Science, 52(8):1288--1290.
Boot, A., Milbourn, T. and Schmeits, A. (2006). Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanisms Review of Financial Studies, 19(1):81--118.
Perotti, E. and Biais, B. (2002). Machiavellian Privatization American Economic Review, 92(1):240--258.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (2001). The Many Faces of Information Disclosure Review of Financial Studies, 14(4):1021--1057.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (2000). Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition? The Journal of Finance, 55(2):679--713.
Perotti, E. and Kulatilaka, N. (1998). Strategic Growth Options Management Science, 44(8):1021--1031.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (1997). Banking Scope and Financial Innovation. Review of Financial Studies, 10(4):1099--1131.
Boot, A. and Thakor, A. (1997). Financial System Architecture. Review of Financial Studies, 10(3):693--733.
Kulatilaka, N. and Perotti, E. (1995). What is lost by waiting to invest The Journal of Finance, 50(3):990--991.
Berglof, E. and Perotti, E. (1994). The governance structure of the Japanese financial keiretsu Journal of Financial Economics, 36(2):259--284.
Perotti, E. and Spier, K. (1993). Capital structure as a bargaining tool : the role of leverage in contract renegotiation American Economic Review, 83(5):1131--1141.